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C.S. Lewis (1898-1963) was one of the most influentialwriters of his day – an ‘intellectual giant’ it was said.He had, and still has, a vast audience for his children’s
fiction (The Chronicles of Narnia) and for his many books writ-
ten to counter objections to religious belief (notably Mere
Christianity). Lewis taught literature at Oxford and Cam-
bridge Universities all his adult life, and was made a Cam-
bridge professor in 1954. That he was also a deep and lucid
philosopher is evident from his book Miracles (1947). Here he
built maybe the first logically sound and convincing argument
for the existence of something in addition to nature, ‘which we
may call the supernatural’. His argument is analysed below.
Will it convince you? If it is convincing, then it has serious
implications for those like Richard Dawkins who vehemently
deny anything in addition to nature.
Reasoning Beyond Nature
Can all natural phenomena ultimately be explained by sci-
ence – even the physical necessity we observe to govern the
behaviour of all natural things everywhere? Will science one
day find out why gravity and the speed of light and the other
fundamental physical constants are constant, and are also fine-
tuned for intelligent life? No one yet knows how the con-
stants came into being or why they are as they are, and so
nature’s laws seem to lack an accessible basis. Yet if the values
of those constants had been different, neither our world nor
life as we know it could have come into being. So the funda-
mental constants are the ‘givens’ that set the very framework
of nature within which all events appear to have only natural
causes, and wherein science is done. This is the arena in
which naturalism prevails.
C.S. Lewis defined naturalism as “the doctrine that only
Nature – the whole interlocked system – exists. And if that
were true, every thing and event would, if we knew enough, be
explicable without remainder… as a necessary product of the
system” (p.18). Lewis wrote these words in his book Miracles
(1947). Here he grants that there can be no miracles unless
there exists something else in addition to nature “which we
may call the supernatural.” This distinction, he explains, is not
between mind and matter, much less between soul and body,
but between nature and “something else” – something which
Lewis believes has to exist in addition to nature, and which he
aims to identify.
To Lewis, a miracle would be “an interference with Nature
by supernatural power” (p.5). Lewis’s definition is crucially
different to the one David Hume used in his celebrated essay
Of Miracles (1777) – namely, that a miracle would be a “viola-
tion of the laws of nature.” This is still the popular idea of a
miracle: that it is a happening in which the laws of physics or
biology are suspended.
Lewis explicitly denies this. “We are in the habit of talking
as if the laws of Nature caused events to happen; but they have
never caused any event at all… They state the pattern to which
every event – if only it can be induced to happen – must con-
form” he writes in Miracles on p.93. So a miracle would not
violate or suspend nature’s laws, but would rather feed new
events into nature. A miracle would occur if a supernatural
cause was somehow fed into nature and digested – just like any
other cause – by nature’s law-like system.
For Lewis naturalism would entail determinism. His view
of nature is of a regime in which everything that happens
depends on something else happening within the system, and
ultimately on the whole system of interlocking events. To
show that miracles are possible, then, Lewis needs to prove
that something exists which neither depends on nature’s inter-
locking system, nor could be explained as being a necessary
product of it. This singular exceptional item, he decides, is
rational thought, ‘which is not part of the system of Nature’:
“Acts of reasoning are not interlocked with the total interlocking system of
Nature as all its other items are interlocked with one another. They are
connected with it in a different way; as the understanding of a machine is
certainly connected with the machine, but not in the way the parts of the
machine are connected with each other. The knowledge of the thing is not
one of the thing’s parts. In this sense something beyond Nature operates when-
ever we reason.” (pp.37-38; my italics)
And so he decides that the distinction between the supernat-
ural and the natural is actually between Reason and Nature,
“the frontier coming not where the ‘outer world’ ends and
what I would ordinarily call ‘myself’ begins, but between
reason and the whole mass of non-rational events, whether
physical or psychological.” (p.38)
To justify this conclusion, Lewis needs to prove that if all
events, including crucially mental events (acts of thinking),
were in fact causally determined, then we could never decide
anything by logical reasoning. We could never do so, he says,
because rational judgements do not depend on a causal relation
between causes and their effects, but on a logical relation
between premises and the conclusions we infer from them.
Lewis will then need a further argument to prove that logical
reasoning is not itself a natural capacity in the same way that
eyesight and hearing are definitely natural, since if reasoning
was natural in the same way, it would be subject to natural
causes in the way our senses are. He believes our power of rea-
soning did not come about in the same way as our five senses:
it was not evolved in us by a process of natural selection. But
why should anyone believe that the power of reason is not
simply a product of natural selection?
Supernatural Reasoning
Lewis begins his argument by claiming that all possible
knowledge of what is true depends on the validity of reasoning:
“Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true” he
says in Miracles on p.21.
Now a train of reasoning is valid, that is, has value as a
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means of finding truth, only if each step is connected with
what went before in a ground-consequent relation. The easiest
way of illustrating this relation, Lewis suggests, is to notice
two distinct senses of the word because. We can say, “Grandfa-
ther is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday.” We can also
say, “Grandfather must be ill today because he hasn’t got up
yet (and we know he is an invariably early riser when he is
well).” In the first sentence because indicates the causal relation
of cause and effect: the eating made him ill. In the second, it
indicates the logical relation of ground and consequent: the old
man’s late rising is the reason why we believe him to be unwell.
One indicates a connection between events or state of affairs,
the other a logical relation between beliefs or assertions.
Unless a conclusion is the logical consequent from a ground, it
will be worthless and could be true only by a fluke. Thus con-
clusions depend on logic rather than on physical causes for
their validity, even if those physical causes are, for example,
previous states of the brain.
Although Lewis never refers to it, Immanuel Kant had
advanced precisely this argument 160 years earlier in his
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). There Kant
wrote, “We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being con-
sciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements. If a
rational being were conscious of any such external influence,
he would regard his judgements as determined, not by reason,
but by impulse. Reason must – if it to be reason at all – regard
itself as the author of its own principles independently of
external influences.” (p.448) If every judgement which is the
conclusion of an argument was caused (i.e., determined) solely
by previous mental/brain events and yet was not a rational
insight into a connection between premises and conclusion,
there would be no difference between valid and invalid infer-
ences, and ultimately there could be no truth. In that case a
doctrine of naturalism which entailed causal determinism
could not be accepted as true, nor could any argument in its
defence be accepted as valid. Hence Lewis’s own claim that
“Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true.” But
he took it as self-evident (as presumably we all do) that human
beings are able to make valid rational inferences and do form
true beliefs.
Lewis’s argument reduces to this:
1) Naturalism (defined as the doctrine that only nature exists)
entails determinism.
2) If naturalism is true our beliefs are held on the basis of non-
rational (ie deterministic) causes, and we would not be able to
make inferences.
3) In that case we are not able to cite reasons to justify holding
our beliefs.
4) But it is incontestable that we do in fact reach truths by log-
ical inferences.
5) Therefore we must either reject naturalism as false, or stop
taking for granted that we reach true beliefs by logical infer-
ences.
6) We cannot stop taking for granted that our beliefs are gen-
erally true.
7) Therefore we must conclude that naturalism is false, and
that something else exists in addition to nature.
Unsound Evolutions
Lewis thought that this refuted naturalism and proved the
truth of supernaturalism. However, as Kant knew, although
this argument is logically valid, it nevertheless may be
unsound. The second premise could be false. Even if natural-
ism were true, and all our thoughts and beliefs were causally
determined by antecedent events, we might still be able to
make inferences. Rational thinking was surely conducive to
survival and reproduction in our ancestors, hence a practice
which natural selection is bound to preserve and refine. If
there is nothing but nature, one would expect reason to have
come into existence by a historical process. So Lewis saw that
he had to disprove the claim that “The type of mental behav-
iour we now call rational thinking or inference must have been
‘evolved’ by natural selection, by the gradual weeding out of
types less fitted to survive.” (p.28).
Natural selection operates by eliminating biologically
harmful responses and preserving responses which tend to aid
survival. But how can any biological improvement in
responses ever turn them into acts of logical insight – into a
power of seeing how a valid argument’s conclusion must follow
from its premises? The relation between response and stimu-
lus is categorically different from that between knowledge and
the truth known: “Our physical vision is a far more useful
response to light than that of the cruder organisms which have
only a photo-sensitive spot. But neither this improvement nor
any possible improvements we can suppose could bring it an
inch nearer to being knowledge of light. It is admittedly some-
thing without which we could not have had that knowledge.
But the knowledge is achieved by experiments and inferences
from them, not by refinement of the response. It is not men
with specially good eyes who know about light, but men who
have studied the relevant sciences.” (Miracles, p.29.)
Vision is a physical or bodily response, but our psychological
responses to our environment – our curiosities, aversions,
delights, expectations – might likewise be indefinitely
improved without ever becoming anything other than
responses. If our psychological responses (in contrast to our
logical insight) were slowly perfected by natural selection, then
that might count as a different method for achieving survival –
as an ‘alternative to reason’: “A conditioning which secured
that we never felt delight except in the useful or aversion save
from the dangerous, and that degrees of both were exquisitely
proportional to the degree of real utility or danger in the
object, might serve us as well as reason or in some circum-
stances better,” Lewis writes on p.29. But even if such refine-
ment of our non-rational psychological responses did happen,
it could never convert them from being mere reactions to a cause
into being valid inferences.
Finally Lewis considers the possibility that although reason
did not evolve through natural selection, it may have been pro-
duced naturalistically through experience – originally individual
experience, but the results passed on by tradition and instruc-
tion. For instance, if we often experienced finding fire (or the
remains of a fire) where we had seen smoke, this would condi-
tion us to expect fire whenever we saw smoke. This expecta-
tion, expressed as ‘If smoke, then fire’ has become what we call
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an inference. “It might be held that this [conjunction of experi-
ences], in the course of millennia, could conjure the mental
behaviour we call reason – in other words, the practice of
inference – out of mental behaviour which was not originally
rational” Lewis writes on p.29. Thus experience produces
expectations: it will induce us to expect fire when we see smoke
just as it once induced us to expect that all swans would be
white (until we saw a black one), or that water would always
boil at 100ºC (until we tried a picnic on a mountain). How-
ever, such expectations were not valid inferences for they
turned out to be false:
“The assumption that things which have been conjoined in the past will
always be conjoined in the future is the guiding principle not of rational
but of animal behaviour. Reason comes in precisely when you make the
inference ‘Since always conjoined, therefore probably connected’ and go
on to attempt the discovery of the connection. When you have discovered
what smoke is, you may then be able to replace the mere expectation by a
genuine inference. Till this is done, reason recognises the expectation as a
mere expectation.” (Miracles, p.30)
Conclusions
We granted earlier that Lewis’s primary argument is logi-
cally valid, but doubted the truth of its second premise. Isn’t it
possible, we asked, even if naturalism is true, that an ability to
think rationally could be the product of natural selection, or
even of experience? Lewis’s answer is firmly negative. Evolu-
tion and/or experience equipped us to foresee causal connec-
tions between events, but not to see how things outside our
own minds logically ‘must’ be. The power of reason is there-
fore not part of the system of nature.
Did Lewis succeed in producing possibly the first ever logi-
cally sound proof of the supernatural – “something beyond
Nature” which operates whenever we reason? Almost by defi-
nition, a sound argument is one that persuades or convinces
you to believe that its conclusion is true. Are you persuaded?
It comes down to an essentially personal judgement.
If, as I believe, Lewis is right in claiming that human reason
wasn’t made by either natural selection or experience, then is it
a ‘given’, just as the fundamental physical constants are givens?
Both the constants and reason seem to be distinct from nature.
Like the constants, reason is a prerequisite of science: it is its
most basic tool – for without rational inference there could be
no truth, and so no science could be true. And reason is not
only as necessary as the physical constants; it is also – again like
them – universal and constant. It is certainly true that without
the combination of the physical constants and human reason,
life as we now know it on this planet could not have come into
being.
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